I would think someone with your legal reputation would be interested in reading the whole thing, but I excerpted the part where Smith addresses the PRA.

"The Court must decide whether the unstated legal premise embedded in the Court’s recent order represents “a correct formulation of the law,” ECF No. 407 at 2—that is, whether the PRA’s distinction between personal and presidential records determines whether possession is authorized or unauthorized under Section 793(e). The answer to that question is plainly no, for the reasons set forth at length in the Government’s response to Trump’s motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 373. In short, during the period charged in the indictment, authorization to possess classified information was governed by Executive Order 13526 and its implementing regulations, which applied to Trump as a former President. See EO § 4.4(a)(3); Trump v. United States, 2022 WL 4366684, at *8. Nothing in the PRA remotely purports to override Executive Order 13526, and construing it in that atextual manner would raise serious constitutional concerns. See ECF No. 373 at 10-12.8 The Government’s proposed jury instruction presented first below reflects the premise that the PRA is irrelevant to the element of unauthorized possession.

The two scenarios posited by the Court, on the other hand, rest on the incorrect premise that a former President is authorized to possess classified information—regardless of whether he has a security clearance or a need to know, and regardless of whether he complies with applicable safeguarding regulations, see 32 C.F.R. § 2001.43—so long as it is contained within a personal record. As a result, both of the Court’s scenarios are fundamentally flawed and any jury instructions that reflect those scenarios would be error. Nevertheless, as directed by the Court, the Government below provides jury instructions for each of these two legally erroneous scenarios.9

Whatever the Court decides, it must resolve these crucial threshold legal questions promptly. The failure to do so would improperly jeopardize the Government’s right to a fair trial and deprive it of its right to seek appellate review. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(d); United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 1994); In re United States, 397 F.3d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2004)."